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Value of Joint Programs Underestimated 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] I am happy to comment on a provocative monograph that raises important issues for union 
policies and strategies. 
The authors make two main points: 
1. Unions should be proactive in developing worker participation programs in industry and should push 
them beyond the shopfloor into strategic economic and technological issues. 
2. As far as possible, worker participation programs should be controlled by the union. Union leaders 
should firmly reject programs jointly controlled by union and management. 
I agree with the first point and disagree with the second. I also question what I see as a bias in selecting 
case examples to support the Banks-Metzgar thesis. If authors are free to choose any cases to support 
their arguments, they can "prove" almost anything. 
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William F Whyte 
I am happy to comment on a provocative monograph that raises 
important issues for union policies and strategies. 
The authors make two main points: 
1. Unions should be proactive in developing worker partici-
pation programs in industry and should push them beyond the 
shopfloor into strategic economic and technological issues. 
2. As far as possible, worker participation programs should be 
controlled by the union. Union leaders should firmly reject 
programs jointly controlled by union and management. 
I agree with the first point and disagree with the second. I also 
question what I see as a bias in selecting case examples to support 
the Banks-Metzgar thesis. If authors are free to choose any cases 
to support their arguments, they can "prove" almost anything. 
The bias issue arises in the most clear cut form in the authors' 
use of the Harrison Radiator case, where the cost study team was 
organized and controlled exclusively by the local union. The case 
was drawn from A Fighting Chance, a book published by 
Programs for Employment and Workplace Systems in Cornell 
University's New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations. What Banks-Metzgar do not mention is that A Fighting 
Chance also discussed two other cases (ACTWU Local 14A at 
Xerox Corp. in Webster, New York, and UAW Local 2100 at Trico 
Products Corp. in Buffalo) in which the cost study team was a 
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joint project of the union and management. 
Drawing Lessons from the Cases 
If we look at the three cost study team cases in the Cornell book 
instead of just focusing on Harrison Radiator, what conclusions 
can we draw? My conclusion is that what the union should do 
depends very much upon the recent history and current nature 
of union-management relations in its particular company. Banks 
and Metzgar take a contrary view based upon the implicit assump-
tion that U.S. management is monolithic, that all managers act 
toward the union in the same way, and therefore that a universal 
prescription can be written. 
In the Trico case, management and the UAW local had been 
experiencing a fairly conventional adversarial relationship. 
Furthermore, by the time our Cornell team was able to get 
involved with this case, the chief executive officer had already 
persuaded his board of directors to go the maquiladora route, 
shifting assembly operations to plants under construction in 
Matamoros, Mexico and Brownsville, Texas. Furthermore, the 
CEO refused to put the construction projects on hold during the 
time when the cost study teams were carrying our their analyses 
and preparing their reports. Complete success on these projects 
would have required the CEO to reverse course, write off some 
millions of dollars already invested in the maquiladora plan, and 
shift the investments into the Buffalo operations. In a project 
operating under such extremely adverse conditions, it seemed 
extraordinary that several hundred jobs were saved, according to 
union leaders. 
In the Xerox case, the joint program was built upon a foundation 
of a long history of relatively cooperative union-management 
relations. Here the joint cost study teams were spectacularly 
successful, from the standpoint of the union and management. 
They have been credited with saving over 900 jobs and helping 
to make possible a 21% increase in employment in the Webster, 
New York plants between January 1983 and July 1988. The ability 
of the parties to work together to save jobs also made it possible 
for the ACTWU to secure an extraordinary employment guarantee 
in the 1983 and again in the 1986 contracts with Xerox. The clause 
guaranteed against layoffs any member of the bargaining unit who 
had at least three years of seniority with the company. Finally, 
as key members of management, working with the cost study 
teams, persuaded themselves of the value of this participative 
strategy, management extended worker participation into the 
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design process for building a new plant and also into the research 
and development program. Management reports now that the 
reorganized program for research and development has reduced 
by more than 50% the time it takes Xerox to bring a new product 
to the market. In a highly competitive field, profitability and jobs 
frequently depend upon how quickly the company can get a new 
product to the market, so these participative changes have been 
of major benefit both to labor and management. 
In the Harrison Radiator case, when the union leaders and 
members of management who had been involved in the 
warehouse project met with their counterparts in Xerox and 
ACTWU in a December 1988 workshop at Cornell to review and 
evaluate their experiences, the union leaders told us that they 
themselves had doubts about their go-it-alone strategy. They had 
insisted on that strategy because they did not trust management 
at the time, but they were still hoping to develop relations that 
would make it possible to carry out joint projects in the future. 
Questioning Implicit Assumptions 
I question the implicit assumption underlying the argument 
against joint programs. According to the Banks-Metzgar thesis, 
joint programs enable management to learn valuable worker 
secrets to use against workers in the future and also help manage-
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ment to manipulate workers so as to change their attitudes and 
behavior. The unstated corollary of that proposition is that a joint 
program has no effect upon the attitudes and behavior of the 
managers who are involved in it and furthermore provides no 
worker opportunities to share in management secrets. 
As a general proposition, that argument is patently false. In the 
Xerox case as well as in others we have observed over the years, 
wherever a joint participative program has been fully implemented 
and has produced good results, it has also had important influences 
on managerial attitudes and behavior. Where the union leadership 
plays a strong role in the joint program, it is unrealistic to assume 
that the program can be used simply to extract worker secrets for 
the benefit of management. In the normal course of business of 
any large and complex organization, there are innumerable 
management secrets that could be useful to the union, but they 
have traditionally been withheld in defense of managerial 
prerogatives. When a joint program is successfully conducted, 
traditional managerial prerogatives tend to be breached in 
important ways. For example, in the Xerox case, management 
agreed to provide the members of the cost study teams with any 
financial and operating information that might be useful to them. 
Without this deep penetration into traditional management secrets, 
it would have been impossible to achieve the results gained by 
the Xerox cost study teams. 
I would also question another implicit assumption underlying 
the Banks-Metzgar thesis: that the role universally played by 
American managers involves simply exploiting workers, without 
contributing any intelligence to the organization of the produc-
tion and the assembly operations. Over the years, I have seen 
various cases that fit that model, but I have also seen cases where 
managers have learned from experience to respect the intelligence 
and job knowledge of workers and have devised creative ways 
to help the parties work together for mutual advantage. 
The history of labor relations in this country provides more than 
enough evidence to suggest that workers and union leaders should 
be skeptical regarding managerial intentions and competence, but 
it is poor policy for union leaders to assume that every manage-
ment has the same exploitative characteristics or that managerial 
behavior cannot be changed to the advantage of workers when 
the parties get together on joint projects, with strong union 
leadership. 
Finally, I question the authors' thesis on the "ideology of 
cooperationism." I agree that the main benefits to be gained from 
participation arise from the information and ideas possessed by 
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workers, but how can these payoffs be obtained? Many impor-
tant ideas do not get expressed initially in a form that clearly 
proves their practical value. A good idea may come encumbered 
with technical problems. Where mutual respect and trust prevail, 
the parties will try to resolve those technical problems so as to 
transform the idea into action. Where mutual respect and trust 
are lacking, good ideas have much less chance of being refined 
and acted upon. 
No doubt there are managers who hope to use participation 
simply to secure more willing worker compliance with managerial 
actions, but such an orientation does not fool workers for long. 
If they do not see their participation producing changes in com-
pany policies and managerial behavior, they decide management 
is not to be trusted and withhold their cooperation. 
Attitudes of mutual respect and trust should not be regarded 
as ends in themselves but rather as conditions influencing the abili-
ty of the parties to achieve their objectives in the collective bargain-
ing relationship. • 
